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Purpose: This study investigates share price anticipation of future earnings in the context of 
Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) emerging countries. We also examine whether the 
relationship between stock return and future earnings vary with companies’ financial 
leverage level, in the presence of proprietary costs and institutional ownership. 
Methodology/Approach: in this paper, we use the modified future earnings response 
coefficient model (FERC) of Collins et al (1994) to measure the ability of stock prices to 
predict future earnings in the presence of institutional owners, political and proprietary cost 
for a sample of 69 firms in MENA emerging capital markets and during the period of 2005-
2008. Our research model builds on multiple regression analysis and assumes interaction 
between current and future earnings and the above mentioned variables. 
Findings: we show that the informativeness of current earnings is negatively associated with 
financial leverage level, institutional ownership and proprietary cost. Our results indicate 
moreover that the presence of institutional owners do not help stock prices predict future 
earnings. Furthermore, neither firms’ leverage nor lower market entries barrier seems to 
have an impact on current returns anticipation of future earnings. 
Practical implications: Providing evidence on the information content of earnings and its 
interaction with some proprietary, political and governance factors in the context of MENA 
emerging markets helps to a better understanding for capital market participants of the value 
relevance of such financial information.  
Originality of the paper: This study adds to the literature on share price anticipation of 
earnings in two crucial respects. First, on a theoretical basis we consider the effect of 
Proprietary Cost, political cost and institutional ownership on the future return earnings 
relationship. Second, we give some insight into the future return-earnings relation in MENA 
emerging countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate disclosure is a communication process within which a corporation shares its 
financial situation with investors and related parties through the most common way of 
disclosure: the financial reporting and in particular the annual reports. In fact, with the 
separation of firm’s equity ownership from its control, corporate disclosure has become a 
critical element for the functioning of an efficient capital market. Demand for corporate 
disclosure can arise from information asymmetry problem and agency conflicts between 
management and outside stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Corporate disclosure is 
believed then to mitigate these problems. Investors  may  better understand accounting 
information and  make  better  predictions for the future which positively affects the market 
value of the company and the  liquidity  of  its  shares ( Francis and Nanda, 2008).  
Several prior studies were interested in examining the usefulness of some financial statements 
items and particularly accounting earnings. They addressed the issue of whether investors 
perceive accounting information as value relevant in that it improves equity valuation 
outcome. An important attribute of existing studies in this area is the focus on the 
contemporaneous annual return-earnings relationship and the changes to this dynamic and 
complex relation. In fact, from Ball and Brown (1968) forward, the literature on the returns-
earnings relation has been characterized by continual refinement and considerable 
methodological sophistication. The “naïve” earnings expectation model exhibited notable 
ingenuity and improvement since a body of research (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Amir and Lev, 
1996; Collins et al., 1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Brown et al., 1999; Ely and Waymire, 
1999) raised a decline in the value relevance of accounting earnings. 
Healy and Palepu’s (2001) paper discussed several significant forces in the economic 
environment that may influence the nature of corporate financial reporting. The rapid 
technological innovation, the changes in the business economics of audit and financial analyst 
firms, and market globalization are the main factors with a potential to shape financial 
disclosure. For instance, the traditional financial reporting model would not be able to capture 
the economic implications of many of these changes in a timely manner. Kothari and Shanken 
(1992) and Collins et al. (1994) relate the weakened association to the poor specification of 
the empirical model. They notice that current earnings do not reflect in a timely manner all the 
news received in the current period and that causes the market to revise its expectation about 
future earnings resulting in a low R
2
 for the empirical model.  
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Nevertheless, introducing future earnings into the return–earnings model specification, as in 
Lundholm and Myers (2002), current and future earnings yield large increases in its 
explanatory power of the annual return variation. 
In this paper, we extend the Lundholm and Myers (2002) paper of bringing the future forward 
and value relevance studies by introducing proprietary cost, financial leverage and 
institutional ownership variables that they assume to be invariant across firms. Because large 
institutional ownership provides monitoring for shareholders and mitigates potential 
managerial abuse (Holderness, 2003), firms will disseminate value relevant information. As 
such, we expect that earnings informativeness will be improved. We also consider the effect 
of financial leverage on the ability of stock price to predict future earnings since Dhaliwal et 
al. (1991) argue that firms with higher debt ratio are less valued due to the lower value 
relevance of their contemporaneous earnings. Proprietary cost are introduced, in the other 
hand based on the assumption that firms with higher proprietary cost are likely to have a 
weaker association between current stock return and future earnings (Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990). Adding these variables to the return–future earnings model specification 
provides an opportunity to examine the differential effects that institutional ownership, 
financial leverage and proprietary cost impose on this association 
MENA emerging markets countries provides an interesting avenue for our research since 
most prior studies on share price anticipation of earnings were undertaken in the context of 
developed countries (US, UK) sharing a specific institutional milieu in term of ownership 
structure, investor protection and capital markets development.  On the other side MENA 
countries have different institutional and economic milieu inherited from either the old British 
or the French colonial era which are likely to influence their accounting system and their 
corporate disclosure (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2008). Furthermore, MENA regions include 
huge disparities among countries in term of economic development and size of capital 
markets (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2010) which is likely to shape their accounting model and 
the value relevance of their financial information. 
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework for information disclosure and the associated literature review. Section 3 describes 
the study’s model and methodology. Empirical results and their discussion are provided in 
section 4. Finally, concluding comments are provided in section 5. 
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2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Share price anticipation of future earnings and financial leverage 
Akerlof (1970) stated that information or “lemon” problem arises from information 
asymmetry and conﬂicting incentives between buyers and sellers which can potentially create 
an adverse selection problem and leads to break down in the functioning of the market. 
Signalling theory addresses then information asymmetry in market and asymmetry can be 
reduced if the party with more information signals to others (Morris, 1987). Managers usually 
have better information than other stakeholders, and therefore outsiders may interpret any 
additional information as signals to the stock market. This information will be used by 
investors who are looking to gather more news about the firm, its valuation and the overall 
future prospects (Jones and Murrell, 2001). A large number of papers investigated how 
corporate disclosure is apprehended as a signal to the financial market. Prior studies like 
Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Verrecchia (1983) and Hughes (1986) postulate that in the 
presence of high information asymmetry, managers’ decision to disclose or not value-relevant 
information depends mainly on whether they learned the value of the signal and after bearing 
in mind the disclosure impact on current shareholders’ wealth.   
Assessing the informativeness of earnings is a major motivation for market based accounting 
research. The main objective of such study is to examine whether accounting earnings 
summarize and catch timely changes in the information set that will be reflected in firms’ 
security returns (Kothari, 2001). The underlying logic in these returns-earnings association 
studies is that any revision in stock prices provides evidence on earnings usefulness. 
Nevertheless, despite the clear statistical association between contemporaneous returns and 
earnings measures, this relation is consistently found to be to be very low and sometimes 
negligible (Lev, 1989). Collins et al., (1994) and Warfield and Wild (1992) suggest that 
earnings lack of timeliness is the main reason for the low quality of accounting earnings and 
hence for the declining return earnings relation. They contend in the same vein that, in an 
efficient market, stock returns is driven by the unexpected component of current period 
earnings and any new information that leads the market to revise its expectations about future 
periods’ earnings. Earning lack of timeliness implies therefore that some information in 
current earnings is already anticipated by past prices and hence uncorrelated with current 
returns. They suggest hence as a refinement to the traditional return-earnings model by 
including future earnings in the returns-earnings model specification. 
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Dhaliwal, Lee and Fargher (1991) and Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) focused on the 
relationship between unexpected earnings and stock returns and the effect of financial 
leverage on it. They demonstrated that financial leverage as long as default risk significantly 
and negatively impact earnings informativeness. This suggests that firms with higher debt to 
equity ratio are less valued due to the lower value relevance of contemporaneous earnings. 
Moreover, if firm’s financial leverage increases, costs associated with high level of risk and 
the possibility of bankruptcy also increases. Accordingly, the prediction of firm future 
performance by the current earning became more difficult. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
argue in the other hand that when leverage is high, managers are more likely to exploit the 
discretionary latitude available in accounting which could mitigate the value relevance of 
accounting earnings.  
Based on above, we postulate: 
H1.  Share price anticipation of future earnings is negatively associated with firm financial 
leverage level. 
2.2 share price anticipation of future earnings and Institutional ownership 
Under the agency theory framework, prior studies (Vafeas, 2000; Karamanou et al. 2005; 
Petra, 2007) figured out if the information content of financial disclosure will depend on some 
characteristics of issuing firms and notably corporate governance attributes. In fact, corporate 
governance mechanisms are introduced to control the agency problem and to ensure that 
managers act in the interest of shareholders. Corporate disclosure is, thus, considered as a tool 
of controlling managers and protecting shareholders against manager’s opportunism, making 
them more likely to release frequent and regular disclosures.  
Institutional investors hold large block of shares in capitals of large companies. The 
magnitude of their ownership leads them to become the main actor in corporate governance 
structures (Lakhal, 2006). Indeed, agency theory assumes that institutional owners are able to 
reduce discretionary managerial power over corporate disclosure especially when managers 
hold high percentage in firm’s equity (Healy et al. 1999). Institutional investors are likely to 
attenuate managers' non-value maximizing behavior, and as such, the opportunities for 
managers to capitalize on the latitude in accounting techniques are reduced. The study by 
Rajgopal et al. (1999) shows a strong negative relation between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and institutional ownership. 
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 This is consistent with the view that institutional owners are better informed, thus the 
perceived benefits of managing accruals are reduced and the informativeness of accounting 
earnings will be enhanced. Cornett et al. (2007) corroborated furthermore the assumption 
regarding the positive influence of institutional investors on firm valuation. Karamanou et al. 
(2005) argue in the other hand that the presence of institutional investors will deter managers 
to practice strategic behavior towards earning forecast disclosure. They expect thus that firms 
characterized by the presence of a large institutional ownership will disseminate relevant 
information.  
We hypothesize thus: 
H2. Share price anticipation of future earnings is stronger for firms with high institutional 
ownership. 
2.3 share price anticipation of future earnings and proprietary costs 
Verrecchia (1983) and Darrough and Stoughton, (1990) argue that ﬁrms’ decisions to disclose 
information to investors is inﬂuenced by concern that such disclosures can damage their 
competitive position in product markets. Luo et al (2006) define proprietary cost as “the costs 
associated with strategic decision-making by a competitor using all available information, 
including firms’ private information”. In fact, King and Wallin (1995) appraise that private 
information related to future earnings are valuable for financial market and business 
competitors. This is likely to weaken firm competitive position and restrain corporate 
disclosure. Moreover, Verrecchia (1983) considers that firms tend to decrease their disclosure 
if it produces proprietary cost and conversely, disclosure can result in minimum proprietary 
cost if the disclosure deters the opponent from taking an adverse action. Bamber and Cheon 
(1998) reported evidence supporting this point of view: they revealed that firms tend to 
disclose less precise information on behalf its future earnings when proprietary costs are high 
(few competitors). Finally, Gelb (2000) found that firms are more likely to decrease the level 
of their disclosure when high proprietary cost exists and use as a substitute other mechanisms 
such as dividend payout or stock repurchases in order to convey favorable news. Firms will 
balance then their desire to convey private information under a tradeoff between costs and 
benefits.  
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For instance, whereas, higher precision of financial information increases the ability to 
accurately predict the future performance of the firm, Information of higher quality decreases 
the barriers to entry in the product market and thus has an adverse effect on the incumbent 
firm. This leads to the prediction that the level of predictability is negatively associated with 
propriety costs (Cohen, 2002). 
Based on above, we state the following hypothesis: 
H3. Share price anticipation of earnings is weaker for firms with high proprietary cost. 
3. Research model and methodology 
This section discusses research’s model, our research design and helps explain where we 
obtained data. 
3.1 Regression Model 
Our empirical model is derived from earlier studies and in particular Collins et al. (1994). In 
fact, they used the future earning response coefficient (FERC) to assess the value relevance of 
current and future earnings. This coefficient is determined by regressing current stock return 
on current and future earnings and stock returns plus control variables. This regression model 
was applied in many recent research (e.g. Banghoj and Plenborg, 2008; Gelb and Zarowin, 
2002; Hanlon et al. 2007; Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Schleider et al 2007) and is 
considered as a standard technique for measuring the ability of stock returns to predict future 
performance. 
Thus the applied regression model is: 
Rt=b0+b1Xt+∑  
 
   k+1Xt+k+ ∑  
 
   k+N+1Rt+k+b2N+2AGt+b2N+3EPt-1 + et   
Where: 
Rt : stock return for year t 
Rt+1, Rt+2, Rt+3: stock returns for year t+1, t+2, t+3 respectively. 
Xt, Xt+1, Xt+2, Xt+3: are defined as earnings change for year t, t+1, t+2, t+3 respectively. 
EPt-1: Are earnings of period t–1  
AGt: is the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t. 
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To test empirically all of our assumptions we will proceed as follow. The effect of firms’ 
financial leverage level on share price anticipation of future earnings will be first checked by 
interacting all the independent variables in the regression model with “LEVt” variable 
approximated by debt to equity ratio. The coefficient on LEVt*∑Xt+1 is expected to be 
negative since it is predicted that for high indebted companies future earnings anticipation 
would be difficult which negatively impact the association between stock return and future 
earnings. We test second the interaction between all the independent variables in the 
regression model with institutional ownership. The coefficient on INSt*∑Xt+1 is expected to 
be positive since it is predicted that the presence of institutional owners is likely to increase 
earnings informativeness.   
Finally, the supposed moderating effect of proprietary cost on share price anticipation of 
future earning will be also verified by interacting it with all the independent variables in the 
regression model. In this case we expect that the coefficient on PCt*∑Xt+1 will be negative 
since it is predicted than the more are the proprietary cost the less is the ability of stock return 
to anticipate future earnings. 
 
For the ease of exposition we use the modified and aggregated model as adopted in Lundholm 
and Myers (2002) and Hussainey and Walker (2009) who combined three years of data into 
one aggregated variable and obtained identical results in comparison to separated data. Thus 
our empirical models are below: 
 
M.1: Rt= b0+ b1Xt+ b2Xt3+ b3Rt3+ b4AGt+ b5EPt-1 + et   
M.2: Rt= b0+ b1Xt+ b2Xt3+ b3Rt3+ b4AGt+ b5EPt-1+ b6LEVt + b7LEVt*Xt+ b8LEVt*Xt3+ b9 
LEVt*Rt3+ b10 LEVt*AGt+ b11 LEVt*EPt-1+ et   
M.3: Rt= b0+b1Xt+b2Xt3+b3Rt3+b4AGt+ b5EPt-1+b6INS+b7INS*Xt+ b8INS*Xt3+b9INS*Rt3+ 
b10INS*AGt+b11INS*EPt-1 
M.4: Rt= b0+ b1Xt+ b2Xt3+ b3Rt3+ b4AGt+ b5EPt-1+ b6PCt+ b7PCt*Xt+ b8PCt*Xt3+ 
b9PCt*Rt3+ b10PCt*AGt+b11PCt*EPt-1 
Where : 
 Rt: stock return for year t is calculated as buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period. 
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 Xt: is defined as earnings change per share deflated by share price at t–1 (earning is 
income before extraordinary items). 
 Xt3: is the aggregated three years future earnings change (earning is income before 
extraordinary items). 
 Rt3: aggregated buy-and-hold future stock returns for the 12-month period of t+1, t+2 
and t+3. 
 AGt : is the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t 
 EPt-1: is defined as period t-1earnings per share over price at the year-end of period t-1. 
 LEVt: the level of financial leverage proxied by debt to equity ratio 
 INSt: defined as the percentage of total shares held by institutional investors  
 PCt: proprietary cost is measured by net revenue growth ratio of period t 
 
3.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
The purpose of our research is to investigate share price anticipation of future earnings in the 
presence of financial leverage, institutional ownership and proprietary cost among Middle 
East and North African countries. Particularly we focus on the emerging markets in the 
MENA region since it is argued that investors’ pressure and demand for relevant corporate 
disclosure and corporate governance practice are positively related to the level of capital 
market development (Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2008). So far, Our sample comprises 
companies domiciled in nine MENA emerging capital markets including Morocco, Egypt, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Turkey and UAE and are periodically 
listed from 2005 to 2008. Financial information such as stock returns, earnings per share, 
institutional ownership, financial leverage and net revenues…are gathered from Data Stream 
electronic database. After a series of sample-filtering steps due to unavailability of many 
required information, the process yields a 69 firms related to our period of analysis (2005-
2008). 
Table 1 & 2 summarize the composition of the sample by country and by economic sector:  
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Table.1: the composition of the sample by country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table.2: the composition of the sample by economic sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our sample. The mean (median) current return is 
57.64 (0.2326). The mean (median) current earnings per share change (deflated by share 
price) is 0.93 (0.0350). The mean (median) accumulated 3 year earnings is 0.16 (0.0031) 
while the mean (median) aggregated future returns are negative -1.5763 (-0.2807) suggesting 
a declining performance over some of the future years and which may indicate structural 
changes in the returns over the sample time period. Indeed a closer look at the returns reveals 
that differences in measurement periods explain the differences between current and future 
returns. Current returns are measured in 2005 whereas future returns are measured in the time 
period of 2006-2008. 
            Country Number  of companies 
Morocco 3 
Egypt 3 
Jordan 7 
Kuwait 8 
Israel 19 
Oman 4 
Qatar 6 
Turkey 11 
UAE 8 
TOTAL 69 
 Sector 
 
Number  Of Companies 
Energy  4 
Materials  10 
Industrials  13 
Consumer discretionary  8 
Consumer staples  4 
Healthcare  3 
Financials 15 
Information technology 9 
Telecommunication services 2 
Utilities  1 
TOTAL 69 
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For example, future returns are not affected by the strong (current) returns of 1169 in 2005. 
Furthermore, future returns are affected by the poor or negative earnings change in 
respectively 2006, 2007 and 2008.  
As also evidenced in table 3, the mean (median) of firms’ financial leverage as proxied by 
debt to equity ratio is 76.67 percent (30.2 percent) and the standard deviation is 111.02 
suggestive that not only our sample comprises high indebted firms but also high dispersion 
exist among firms with regard to their financial leverage level.  
With respect to proprietary cost as measured by net revenue growth, the mean (median) is 
3.90 (0.2707) and the standard deviation is 20.42 which indicates likewise considerable 
disparities among firms. 
Finally, institutional ownership is on average quite notable. In fact, the mean (median) is 
about 15.92 percent (7.87 percent) and the standard deviation is 18.06 indicating that the size 
of institutional owners is quit diffused among our sample data firms. 
Pair-wise Pearson correlations coefficients for the main variables are provided in Table 3, 
panel B. In contrast to what is expected, the correlations between the current returns and 
earnings variables are not in general significant. In fact, current return (Rt) seems to be only 
significantly and strongly correlated with current earnings (Xt). In addition, current returns 
are uncorrelated with future returns (R3t) consistent with Collins et al. (1994). This 
correlation indicates that future returns should not inﬂuence the results except through their 
role as a proxy for the measurement error in future earnings. However, current returns are 
strongly correlated with the earnings of period t-1 (EPt-1). This latter is also strongly and 
significantly correlated with current performance which may indicate that earnings of period 
t–1 are a good proxy for the market’s expectations (at time t–1) of the earnings for period t 
and beyond. Furthermore, significant strong correlation is detected between institutional 
ownership (INSt) in one hand and future earnings change (X3t) and proprietary cost (PCt) in 
the other hand. These correlations suggest that the presence of institutional owners may 
impact positively future earnings and may induce more proprietary cost. Finally, a negative 
weak correlation between asset growth (AGt) and firm financial leverage is noticed 
suggesting that high indebted companies have a lower asset growth.   
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Table 3 Summary descriptive statistics:  
Panel A: descriptive statistics 
 
Pearson correlation Panel B: matrix for selected variables (p-values) 
 Rt Xt X3t R3t AGt EPt-1 LEVt PCt INSt 
Rt 1.0000 0.5448*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0096 
(0.9377) 
 -0.0818 
(0.9465) 
-0.1231 
(0.3134) 
0.9178*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0549 
(0.6543) 
-0.0379 
(0.7569) 
-0.0258 
(0.8331) 
Xt  1.0000 -0.0140 
(0.9089) 
-0.0115 
(0.9252) 
-0.1161 
(0.3423) 
0.7718*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0258 
(0.8332) 
-0.0111 
(0.9278) 
-0.1351 
(0.2682) 
X3t   1.0000 0.1556 
(0.2017) 
-0.0157 
(0.8979) 
-0.0097 
(0.9369) 
0.0069 
(0.9554) 
-0.0137 
(0.9113) 
0.2628** 
(0.0291) 
R3t    1.0000 -0.1348 
(0.2696) 
-0.0577 
(0.6379) 
-0.0529 
(0.6662) 
0.1042 
(0.3941) 
-0.0409 
(0.7387) 
AGt     1.0000 -0.1414 
(0.2465) 
-0.2013* 
(0.0973) 
0.1263 
(0.3009) 
-0.1811 
(0.1364) 
EPt-1      1.0000 0.0337 
(0.7831) 
-0.0372 
(0.7615) 
-0.0948 
(0.4383) 
LEVt       1.0000 0.0127 
(0.9175) 
0.0960  
(0.4327) 
PCt        1.0000 0.3005** 
(0.0121) 
INSt         1.0000 
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample firms. Current returns (Rt) t are buy-and-hold returns for 
the 12-month period for year. Current earnings (Xt) for year t are defined as earnings change per share deflated 
by the share price at the end of the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years future earnings change. 
Rt3 is the aggregated three years future returns. EPt-1 is defined as period t–1’s earnings per share over price at 
the year-end of period t–1. (AGt) is the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t. Financial leverage 
(LEVt) is defined as debt to equity ratio. Proprietary cost (PCt) is measured by net revenue growth ratio. 
Institutional ownership (INSt) is defined as the percentage of total shares held by institutional investors. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Variables N Mean Min Median Max S.D 
Current returns (Rt) 69 57.6456 -0.9169 0.2326 1169 232.8581 
Current earnings change (Xt) 69 0.9373 -17 0.0350 58 8.1519 
Accumulated Future earnings change (X3t) 69 0.1671 -1.5776 0.0031 14.8697 1.8315 
Accumulated Future Returns (R3t) 69 -0.0693 -1.5763 -0.2807 2.4189 0.9106 
Asset Growth (AGt) 69 0.4727 -0.2982 0.2464 3.9375 0.6995 
Earnings of Period t-1 (EPt-1) 69 3.8277 -0.6521 0.0852 91 15.7478 
Financial leverage % (LEVt) 69 76.6691 0.034 30.2 468.3 111.0198 
Proprietary cost (PCt) 69 3.8984 -0.4294 0.2707 144.4545 20.4187 
Institutional ownership% (INS) 69 15.9268 0.006 7.87 65.98 18.0611 
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4. Empirical results 
In this section we highlight empirical analysis that attempt to examine the interplay between 
levels of financial leverage, institutional ownership and proprietary cost and the ability of 
stock prices to predict future earnings. Our main empirical results are based on feasible 
generalized least squares regression in order to control for the eventual presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  
(i) The effect of firms’ financial leverage on share price anticipation of future 
earnings 
Table 4 provides regression estimates for the benchmark version (model 1) of the return–
future earnings model and the return–future earnings regression estimates with financial 
leverage level term (model 2). 
As shown in table 4, the results from regression (M2) suggest that current returns appear to be 
strongly and negatively associated with the interaction term of current earnings and financial 
leverage level LEVt*Xt (p < 0.001) suggesting that high indebted companies have negative 
effect on current performance change and this negative effect is reflected in current stock 
returns. Hence, for indebted companies, financial leverage and the value relevance of current 
performance are negatively associated. This is may be due to the likelihood of managers to 
avoid costly debt covenant violation rather than to report earnings that are more informative 
about future cash flows. However, inconsistent with our first hypothesis (H1), no significant 
correlation exists between the interaction term of cumulated future earnings and financial 
leverage level LEVt*X3t and current stock returns. This indicates that current returns do not 
contain information about realized future earnings and that its prediction would be difficult 
when financial leverage is high. 
In addition, despite this insignificant relationship, the sign of coefficient on LEVt*X3t is 
positive. Such unexpected sign may indicate that the more the firms’ financial leverage is the 
more is the capitalization rate of future earnings news into price. In the other side, results 
revealed a significant and negative correlation between current stock returns and cumulated 
future returns LEVt*R3t in the presence of financial leverage. This finding may indicate that 
realized future earnings contain measurement error that future returns remove. 
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Overall, though these results do not support our first hypothesis (H1), it is evidenced that 
financial leverage can reduce the value relevance of current earnings and market expectation 
about firm future prospects.  
Table 4: Comparison of the return–future earnings regression (model 1) and the regression of current returns on 
current and future earnings with financial leverage level interaction terms (model 2) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept - 1.5940                  (0.881) -5.5738                   (0.130) 
Xt -11.5217***            (0.000) 24.3102***              (0.000) 
X3t -0.1168                   (0.980) -3.0760                    (0.563) 
R3t -3.9007                   (0.682) 1.1301                     (0.731) 
AGt 0.5557                    (0.964) 1.2670                     (0.759) 
EPt-1 18.1655***             (0.000) 20.3968***              (0.000) 
LEVt   0.0618                     (0.029) 
LEVt*Xt  -0.3841***               (0.000) 
LEVt*X3t  0.0447                      (0.517) 
LEVt*R3t  -0.0691**                 (0.048) 
LEVt*AGt  0.0241                      (0.779) 
LEVt*EPt-1  -0.0200**                  (0.006) 
Wald chi-square (11) = 9626.05  (p-value): <0.001 
Current earnings (Xt) for year t are defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share price at the end of 
the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years future earnings change. Rt3 is the aggregated three years 
future returns measured as buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period for year.EPt-1 is defined as period t–1’s 
earnings per share over price at the year-end of period t–1. (AGt) is the growth rate of total book value of assets 
for period t. Financial leverage (LEVt) is defined as debt to equity ratio. The model is estimated by feasible 
generalized least squares regression in order to control for the potential presence of heteroskedasticity. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
(ii) The effect of  institutional ownership on share price anticipation of future earnings 
The results from table 5, model 2 infirm our second hypothesis (H2). In fact, the effect of 
institutional ownership level on the return future earnings association is, though positive, 
insignificant. In fact, unlike Jiambalvo and Rajgopal (2001) who found that for firms with 
higher levels of institutional ownership relatively more future earnings information is 
impounded in stock prices in comparison to firms with lower institutional ownership, the 
presence of institutional owners in our sample-firm is not likely to help capital market 
participants predict or anticipate firms’ future performance. This is consistent with Porter 
(1992) view that institutional owners are overly focused on short term earnings.  If this is the 
case, compared to other investors, institutions are less sophisticated and therefore less likely 
to consider factors that affect future period earnings in pricing securities.  
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Moreover results revealed surprisingly a strong and negative association between current 
earnings depending on institutional ownership INSt*Xt and current returns. Hence, in contrast 
to Jeong et al. (2002) and Jeon (2003) who provide evidence that the higher the level of 
institutional ownership, the larger the earnings response coefficient, our findings revealed that 
company with a high percentage of institutional shares has less informative earnings which 
may be inconsistent with the active monitoring hypothesis.  
These unexpected results may be related in part to the lower presence of institutional investors 
in our sample of MENA emerging markets which may mitigate their monitoring role (the 
mean is about 15.92 percent) or to the fact that institutional monitoring induces managers’ 
voluntary disclosures prior to earnings announcements. This is likely to reduce earnings 
informativeness since much of the content of the as yet unannounced earnings are likely to be 
impounded in the pre-disclosure market prices (El-Gazzar, 1998). 
Table 5: Comparison of the return–future earnings regression (model 1) and the regression of current returns on 
current and future earnings with institutional ownership interaction terms (model 2) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept - 1.5940                  (0.881) -8.3034                      (0.383) 
Xt -11.5217***            (0.000) -0.1365                      (0.935) 
X3t -0.1168                   (0.980) 9.6678                     (0.602) 
R3t -3.9007                   (0.682) 1.3023                     (0.884) 
AGt 0.5557                    (0.964) 5.9342                     (0.535) 
EPt-1 18.1655***             (0.000) 11.8785***                (0.000) 
INSt   0.0670                       (0.868) 
INSt*Xt  -0.5400***                (0.000) 
INSt*X3t  0.1720                      (0.616) 
INSt*R3t  -0.0939                      (0.832) 
INSt*AGt  0.0607                       (0.927) 
INSt*EPt-1  0.4117***                 (0.000) 
Wald chi-square (11)=1724.60  (p-value): <0.001 
Current earnings (Xt) for year t are defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share price at the end of 
the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years future earnings change. Rt3 is the aggregated three years 
future returns measured as buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period for year. EPt-1 is defined as period t–
1’s earnings per share over price at the year-end of period t–1. (AGt) is the growth rate of total book value of 
assets for period t. Institutional ownership (INSt) is defined as the percentage of total shares held by institutional 
investors. The model is estimated by feasible generalized least squares regression in order to control for the 
potential presence of heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
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(iii) The effect of proprietary cost on share price anticipation of future earnings 
Table 7 reports the results of H3 testing that predict a weaker return-future earnings relation 
depending on firm proprietary cost level. Inconsistent with Darrough and Stoughton (1990), 
gelb (2000) and Luo et al. (2006), findings revealed non-significant relationship between the 
interacted term PCt*X3t and current returns. This suggests that current stock returns aren’t 
able to predict future earnings change when proprietary cost exists. The coefficient on the 
interaction term PCt*X3t is moreover negative which is in accordance with the fact that the 
amount of future earnings information impounded in current stock price would be less with 
high proprietary cost.  
Results showed furthermore a significant and a negative association between current stock 
returns and current earnings in the presence of proprietary cost. This indicates that investors 
perceive firms’ earnings as less informative since less information is available. Consequently 
when proprietary cost exists firms are likely to restrain private and precise information about 
future cash flows since it is likely to weaken its competitive position. 
One interpretation of these results is that the growth rate of firms’ net-revenue can favor the 
presence of competitors and the likelihood of potential entrants to the product market. Firm 
needs therefore to protect its future opportunities as proxied by current year’s percentage 
change in sales by not providing relevant financial information about future prospects.   
Table 6: Comparison of the return–future earnings regression (model 1) and the regression of current returns on 
current and future earnings with proprietary cost interaction terms (model 2) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept - 1.5940                  (0.881) -0.7694                      (0.932) 
Xt -11.5217***            (0.000)  2.7446                     (0.342) 
X3t -0.1168                   (0.980) -3.6993                       (0.821) 
R3t -3.9007                   (0.682) -2.0886                       (0.764) 
AGt 0.5557                    (0.964) 0.2143                        (0.984) 
EPt-1 18.1655***             (0.000) 13.9564***                (0.000) 
PCt   2.9835                       (0.837) 
PCt*Xt  -15.902***                (0.000) 
PCt*X3t  -8.7778                       (0.833) 
PCt*R3t  0.3090                       (0.944) 
PCt*AGt  -2.5316                      (0.848) 
PCt*EPt-1  8.8392***                  (0.000) 
Wald chi-square (11)=1484.41  (p-value): <0.001 
Current earnings (Xt) for year t are defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share price at the end of 
the financial year t–1. Xt3 is the aggregated three years future earnings change. Rt3 is the aggregated three years 
future return measured as the buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period for year. EPt-1 is defined as period 
t–1’s earnings per share over price at the year-end of period t–1. (AGt) is the growth rate of total book value of 
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assets for period t. Proprietary cost (PCt) is measured by net revenue growth ratio. The model is estimated by 
feasible generalized least squares regression in order to control for the potential presence of heteroskedasticity.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
5. Summary and conclusion 
This paper builds on early market based accounting literature that examines the returns 
earnings relationship and investigates the effect of some firms’ attributes on share price 
anticipation of future earnings. We extend this work in two important ways. First, we focus on 
the interaction between financial leverage, institutional ownership and proprietary cost and 
the ability of stock returns to anticipate future earnings. Indeed, it is well known that the 
quality of financial information and in particular accounting earnings is not only a tradeoff 
between costs and benefits but depends also on some corporate governance mechanisms. 
Second, given these variables, we give some insight into the future return-earnings 
relationship in the context of MENA emerging countries where related literature is relatively 
scarce.  
Based on a sample of 69 firms during the period of 2005-2009 and using the modified future 
earnings response coefficient model of Collins et al. (1994), we showed that the 
informativeness of current earnings is negatively associated with financial leverage level, 
institutional ownership and proprietary cost suggesting that investors perceive negatively the 
usefulness of accounting earnings numbers. Moreover, inconsistent with prior studies, our 
results indicated that the presence of institutional owners do not help stock prices predict 
future earnings. Furthermore, neither firms’ leverage nor lower market entries barrier seems 
to have an impact on share price anticipation of future earnings. 
Our results are of interest to accounting standard setters in MENA emerging markets.  
Whereas the objective of financial information is to improve the predictability of future 
earnings, our findings showed that the informativeness of current earnings is strongly related 
to some firms’ characteristics. 
The conclusions drawn from our study are constrained by several limitations. First, the 
sample firm was relatively limited due to the unavailability for MENA emerging markets of 
many required financial information (stock prices, earnings per share…). Second, empirical 
tests carried out in our study may suffer from omitted variable problems.  
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In fact theoretical and empirical research suggests that the ability of investors to predict future 
earnings would be improved with firms’ propensity to disclose voluntary disclosure 
(Hussainey and walker, 2009; Lundholms and Myers, 2002) and corporate governance 
mechanisms (Bushman et al., 2004).   
For instance, many directions can be taken in future research. We believe that it will be 
interesting to focus on the simultaneous effect of voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance mechanisms on the return future earnings relationship. Extending also the time 
period explored might provide better insights in the comparison between MENA countries. 
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